The MAX

6 Nov 2025

The answer first. 346 people died on two Boeing 737 MAX flights: 189 in Indonesia in October 2018, 157 in Ethiopia in March 2019. In January 2021 Boeing admitted that its employees acted “knowingly, and with intent to defraud” the FAA’s training group, and agreed to pay $2,513,600,000: a $243.6 million penalty, $1.77 billion for airlines (less what it had already paid them) and $500 million for the victims’ heirs. A judge later called the 2021 agreement “a confession from Boeing.” In 2025 Boeing again admitted the facts “constitute a violation of law.” Boeing was never tried: a judge rejected a plea deal in December 2024 and dismissed the case in November 2025. A Boeing pilot tried separately was acquitted.

29 Oct 2018

Jakarta, 29 October 2018. Lion Air flight 610 left for Pangkal Pinang with 189 people on board. About 11 minutes after takeoff, by Indonesia’s report, it was over: the plane was in the Java Sea and no one survived. The committee’s Democratic staff counts more than 20 nose-down commands from MCAS while the pilots fought it. The day before, on the same plane, a third pilot riding in the jump seat had told the crew how to cut power to the trim; that was not written in the log. A rescue diver died in the recovery.

10 Mar 2019

Addis Ababa, 10 March 2019. Paul Njoroge had followed his family’s flight from Toronto and gone to bed once they reached Addis Ababa. His wife Carolyne, their children Ryan, 6, Kelli, 4, and Rubi, 9 months, and her mother Ann boarded flight 302 to Nairobi. Six minutes after takeoff it crashed in a field, 28 nautical miles from the airport by Ethiopia’s report. All 157 people on board died.

15 May 2019

Samya. Samya Stumo was 24, on her way to help set up health-care offices for ThinkWell in countries that needed them. Her parents rushed to Ethiopia to recover her body and learned that what little remained of anyone on the plane could not be recovered. Their May 2019 statement to Congress said: “Families of the victims have not been included in the process, we need to be included at all levels from here on out.” It also said “the Boeing culture of engineering safety may have been destroyed in favor of a Boeing management culture of profit extraction.” That is their view.

Nov 2018 – 10 Mar 2019

Between the crashes. Less than five months separate them. The Democratic staff report says that after Lion Air a Boeing bulletin and an FAA emergency directive did not name MCAS, and the FAA drafted, then deleted, a mention. It says the FAA kept the plane flying despite its own estimate of 15 more crashes and 2,900 deaths. The FAA told the committee it “would never accept a risk of additional accidents without taking immediate action.” The agreed facts say that after Lion Air a Boeing employee had Boeing give the FAA group “a false and misleading presentation.” Muilenburg, 2019: “we would have grounded it right after the first accident.”

2010–2016

A fix for the engines. The committee’s Democratic staff says Boeing faced “tremendous financial pressure” to match Airbus’s new A320neo. The MAX got larger engines, placed differently from the older 737’s, and in one test maneuver, a high-speed wind-up turn, its nose pitched up. The agreed facts say Boeing’s fix was MCAS. The staff found it took readings from a single angle-of-attack sensor, and that Boeing expected pilots, “largely unaware that the system existed,” to cope with any malfunction.

2014–2016

What training was worth. The FAA’s Aircraft Evaluation Group decides how much training pilots need to move from the older 737 to the MAX. “Level B” could be done on a tablet in hours; “Level D” meant a full-flight simulator, so the MAX would cost airlines more. In December 2014, the agreed facts say, Employee-1 wrote that losing Level B would be “thrown squarely on my shoulders,” the man “Who cost Boeing tens of millions of dollars!” Boeing admitted it “derived a pecuniary gross gain of $243,600,000.” The Democratic staff add a Southwest contract: a discount of at least $1 million per plane if simulator training was required.

Jun 2015 – Jul 2017

Wider than told. In June 2015 Boeing told the FAA group that MCAS worked only in a high-speed turn. In March 2016, the Democratic staff reports, Boeing redesigned it for low speeds, and it could now move the stabilizer 2.5 degrees instead of 0.6. The agreement says Boeing told the FAA staff who decide airworthiness but not the training group, and “intentionally withheld and concealed” the change from that group. After the plane entered service, “Pilots flying the 737 MAX for Boeing’s airline customers were not provided any information about MCAS in their airplane manuals and pilot-training materials.”

15 Nov 2016

“Shocker alert.” On 15 November 2016 the chief technical pilot saw MCAS running at low speed in a simulator. A colleague answered in the chat: “it wasn’t a lie, no one told us that was the case.” The agreement says neither corrected the FAA group. Employee-1 proposed deleting MCAS from the FAA’s pilot-training report on 22 November and again on 17 January, and wrote “Flight Controls: Delete MCAS.” It was published on 5 July 2017 without MCAS. The agreement says Boeing’s deceit ran “through at least in and around December 2018.”

2013 – 8 Mar 2017

What the FAA approved. The FAA granted the MAX its amended type certificate on 8 March 2017. The staff report says that in March 2016, hours after Boeing approved the MCAS redesign, Boeing asked and the FAA approved removing MCAS from the pilots’ manual, and the FAA officials who agreed “remained unaware” of the redesign until after Lion Air. It cites a 2016 Boeing survey: 39 percent of authorized representatives responding perceived “undue pressure.” Elwell, FAA acting head, 2019: “We don’t have a program of self-certification.” With robust oversight, “it is a good system.” Asked if MCAS was safety critical: “it seems to me that, yes, it is.” Asked if pilots did not know it was installed until after Lion Air: “Yes, sir.”

25 Oct 2019

Indonesia’s report. On 25 October 2019 KNKT published nine contributing factors, in time order, not ranked. Boeing’s: wrong assumptions about crew response, reliance on a single sensor, “absence of guidance on MCAS” in manuals and training, and an AOA DISAGREE alert not correctly enabled. Maintenance: a replacement sensor mis-calibrated in an earlier repair and missed (the House report says the repairer, Xtra Aerospace of Florida, lost its FAA certificate in 2019), and missing flight-log entries. Last: “multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions” that the crew could not manage, from “the difficulty of the situation” and their own performance.

23 Dec 2022

Ethiopia’s report, and two disputes. Ethiopia names MCAS as most probable cause and says Boeing did not answer the airline’s “safety critical questions” after Lion Air. The U.S. NTSB, which took part, concurs on MCAS but disputes two things. The sensor: Ethiopia says a production electrical fault; the NTSB says the vane was struck by a foreign object, most likely a bird. The crew: the NTSB proposed adding “the flight crew’s inadequate use of manual electric trim and management of thrust,” and says Boeing did answer, on 3 December 2018. Ethiopia’s report calls the emergency directive’s procedures “inadequate and unverified.”

16 Sep 2020

The House inquiry. After 18 months and about 600,000 pages of records, Democratic staff reported on 16 September 2020. Even so, it says “Boeing did not hide MCAS from regulators” while it downplayed it. The committee’s Republican leaders, Sam Graves and Garret Graves: “These recommendations—not a partisan investigative report—should serve as the basis for Congressional action.” The FAA said it would work with lawmakers “to implement improvements identified in its report.” Boeing: “We have learned many hard lessons as a company from the accidents of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, and from the mistakes we have made.”

30 Oct 2019

“I am responsible.” With relatives of the dead in the room, Muilenburg said “we are deeply, deeply sorry.” Asked who bore principal responsibility: “my company and I are responsible.” Asked why MCAS had one sensor from day one: “if back then we knew everything that we know now, we would have made a different decision”; the design extended a speed-trim system with “about 200 million safe flight hours.” Asked whether he had offered to resign: “I have not. I am responsible. These two accidents happened on my watch.” DeFazio had raised his $15 million bonus.

Dec 2020

What Congress changed. The FAA grounded the MAX in the U.S. on 13 March 2019 and published its review for returning it to service on 18 November 2020. In December 2020 Congress passed a certification law. It bars delegating findings on a critical system until the FAA has validated the human-factors assumptions behind it, and, from 2022, requires the FAA to approve each person a company picks for delegated design work. The FAA’s panel under the law reported in 2024 “a disconnect between Boeing’s senior management and other members of the organization on safety culture.”

7 Jan 2021

7 January 2021. The Justice Department charged Boeing with one count of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. and deferred prosecution for three years. Boeing agreed the facts “establish beyond a reasonable doubt the charge.” The department skipped an outside monitor, citing “two of the Company’s 737 MAX Flight Technical Pilots” and misconduct not “facilitated by senior management.” It also found Boeing’s cooperation “delayed,” its response “frustrated” the inquiry, and noted a 1989 conviction. Boeing’s release: “based on the conduct of two former Boeing employees.” In 2025 the judge wrote that the case “targets the corporate culture” and the Government “agrees with that theme.”

23 Mar 2022

The pilot. The agreement does not name its two employees. The House report says Boeing documents’ “Former 737 Chief Technical Pilot” is Mark Forkner, who left in 2018; AP reports prosecutors used a message in which “he said he unknowingly misled regulators.” He was tried alone, and the agreement binds Boeing, not him. A Fort Worth jury took under two hours to find him not guilty on four counts of wire fraud; two of six had been dropped. Prosecutors said he misled the FAA about training. His lawyers said Boeing engineers never told him of the software changes.

21 Oct 2022

“Without Boeing’s fraud.” In February 2020 the Justice Department told families the FBI was not investigating the crash; it later called that “a regrettable and inadvertent internal miscommunication.” The families said the 2021 deal broke their rights. On 21 October 2022 Judge O’Connor ruled they could assert a crime victim’s rights, on the evidence and not as a verdict. The government argued the Lion Air sensor and maintenance broke the chain of cause. He answered that “events often have multiple causes.” In 2023 he found “legal error,” not bad faith, in the department’s failure to confer, and no power to review the deal’s terms.

5 Jan 2024

5 January 2024. After takeoff from Portland, a door plug separated from an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-9. No one died; seven passengers and one flight attendant reported minor injuries. The NTSB says the plug was opened at Boeing’s Renton factory on 18 September 2023 without the required paperwork, and names the FAA’s ineffective surveillance as contributing. In June 2024 Boeing’s chief executive Dave Calhoun told the Senate: “I want to personally apologize, on behalf of everyone at Boeing,” to the families of the 2018 and 2019 victims, and “Our culture is far from perfect, but we are taking action and making progress.”

14 May 2024 – 5 Dec 2024

Breach, plea, rejection. On 14 May 2024 the Justice Department said Boeing breached the 2021 agreement by “failing to design, implement, and enforce a compliance and ethics program.” Its letter names no flight; its later facts cite lapses in removal records and say “Boeing senior executives prioritized the movement of aircraft” over quality. The families say the department acted after the door plug. The July plea: guilt, three years’ probation, $455 million for safety, a monitor. The families objected. The judge rejected it, saying Boeing “hints” it had defences, but “the Government’s attempt to ensure compliance has failed,” and Boeing left breach to the Government’s “sole discretion.”

29 May 2025 – 6 Nov 2025

A different deal. On 29 May 2025 the department and Boeing signed a non-prosecution agreement: a $487.2 million penalty with credit for $243.6 million paid, $444.5 million split equally among the 346 victims’ estates, at least $455 million for safety, and a consultant Boeing picks instead of a monitor. The department said it “secures meaningful accountability.” The judge wrote the deal “does not even pretend to address the need for a truly independent compliance monitor,” called the trial-risk claim “unserious” and said it “fails to secure the necessary accountability to ensure the safety of the flying public.” He dismissed the case on 6 November, saying he lacked the power to refuse.

31 Mar 2026 – 18 Jun 2026

The last word, so far. The Fifth Circuit denied the families’ petitions on 31 March 2026 (revised 22 May; mandate 18 June). The challenge to the 2021 deal was moot; the department did not violate their rights in the 2025 talks; the dismissal it could not review. The families were not of one mind. The department counted families of 29 victims objecting; counsel for 66 families did not oppose but asked that Boeing pay more to certain Lion Air families; Boeing counted over 110. One relative, quoted by the department: “It is hard for me to let go of this case, I want Boeing Company to get the punishment that is appropriate for this case, but I also want the best for me and my children.”