Foreign backing of the Taliban

By October 1994 the movement had attracted the support of Pakistan, which saw in the Taliban a way to secure trade routes to Central Asia and establish a government in Kabul friendly to its interests.

The Pakistan government has repeatedly denied that it provides any military support to the Taliban in its diplomacy regarding its extensive operations in Afghanistan.

Turki allegedly pledged the funds necessary to buy off individual United Front commanders during the upcoming fighting.

Support for the Taliban under Bhutto resided mainly in the interior ministry, according to some analysts.

Pakistan's army and intelligence services, principally the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), contribute to making the Taliban a highly effective military force.

Prince Turki al-Faisal Saud, head of the Saudi General Intelligence Agency, traveled to Pakistan in July 1996; shortly thereafter Saudi Arabia became the Taliban's main financial supporter.

Saudi Arabia was a major financial supporter of the Taliban between the defeat of Hizb-i Wahdat and Hizb-i Islami forces by the Taliban in Kabul in 1996 and the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya

Official Saudi aid reportedly stopped, but Saudi money and support has continued to find its way to the Taliban in the form of private contributions.

Western journalists saw white-painted C-130 Hercules transport aircraft which they identified as Saudi Arabian at Qandahar airport in 1996 delivering artillery and small-arms ammunition to Taliban soldiers.

the Taliban, which received support primarily from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

The duties imposed on trucks transiting Afghanistan from Pakistan became the Taliban's most important official source of income.

A World Bank study estimated that income to the Taliban from taxing the Afghanistan-Pakistan smuggling trade amounted to U.S.$75 million in 1997.

According to Ahmed Rashid, Bhutto's interior minister, Gen. Naseerullah Babar, created the Afghan Trade Development Cell in the ministry ostensibly to promote trade routes to Central Asia but also to provide the Taliban with funds.

They thus might give Pakistan greater security on one of the several borders where Pakistani military officers hoped for what they called “strategic depth.”

Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who had taken charge from the ailing King Fahd, promised Tenet an all-out secret effort to persuade the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin so that he could be sent to the United States or to another country for trial.

Apparently employing a mixture of possible incentives and threats, Turki received a commitment that Bin Ladin would be expelled, but Mullah Omar did not make good on this promise.

While the drug trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for al Qaeda

is supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food.

King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah sent me to meet Mulla Omar to persuade him to hand Bin Laden over to the Kingdom.

I asked Mulla Omar to hand him over and he agreed.