George Tenet

In fall 1999, DCI Tenet unveiled the CIA’s new Bin Ladin strategy.

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet said the agency was still assessing who was responsible, but the early signs all pointed to al Qaeda.

On August 23, DCI Tenet was briefed about the Moussaoui case in a briefing titled “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.”

Tenet told us that no connection to al Qaeda was apparent to him at the time.

Tenet told us that in his world “the system was blinking red.”

Most of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented.

Despite their large number, the threats received contained few

specifics regarding time, place, method, or target. Most suggested that attacks were planned against targets overseas;

the DCI testified before the SSCI that he told the Deputy National Security Advisor that the "President should not be a fact witness on this issue," because his analysts had told him the "reporting was weak."

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) should have taken the time to read the State of the Union speech and fact check it himself.

Until late in the night on February 4, Secretary Powell and Mr. Tenet continued to finalize aspects of the speech.

Mr. Tenet noted that it is inconceivable that he would have failed to raise with Secretary Powell any concerns about information in the speech about which Mr. Tenet had been made aware.