Event
Gulf of Tonkin incidents
One clash with North Vietnamese boats on 2 August 1964, and a second attack reported on 4 August that an NSA historian concluded did not happen.
- Dates
- 2–5 Aug 1964
- The Second Attack22 scenes
- Why did the Gulf of Tonkin incidents happen?2 links, 2 accounts
- How are the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and … connected?
According to Robert J. Hanyok
- caused by OPLAN 34A
- led to Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
According to Robert McNamara
- followed from OPLAN 34A
Connections 16
interventions
- Lyndon B. Johnson 4 Aug 1964 ordered air strikes on North Vietnam Primary record 1
- Robert McNamara 4 Aug 1964 briefed congressional leaders on 4 August 1964 Primary record 1
involved
- Gulf of Tonkin Primary record 1
-
Lyndon B. Johnson
what Johnson was told of Herrick's doubts is disputed between two sources
Primary record
23
The National Archives says McNamara did not report the captain's doubts to Johnson; Hanyok says Johnson required verification because of the doubts.
- USS Maddox destroyer that reported the attacks Primary record 1
- National Security Agency its intercept reports were the "smoking gun" in Washington Primary record 3
- U.S. Department of Defense received the Maddox's warning Primary record 1
- James Stockdale pilot overhead; saw no boats Primary record 3
- John J. Herrick task force commander; doubted the reports within hours Primary record 3
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee its staff studied the incidents in 1968 Primary record 4
- U.S. Navy Primary record 3
caused by
- OPLAN 34A According to Robert J. Hanyok Primary record 3
led to
- Gulf of Tonkin Resolution According to Robert J. Hanyok Primary record 3
followed from
- OPLAN 34A According to Robert McNamara Scholarship & press 5
appears in
- Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish its subject Primary record 3
- Pentagon Papers the Defense Department's own study tells it Primary record 6
Timeline 3 dates
- 2–5 Aug 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incidents
- 4 Aug 1964 Lyndon B. Johnson intervened in Gulf of Tonkin incidents
- 4 Aug 1964 Robert McNamara intervened in Gulf of Tonkin incidents
Proof 6 sources
-
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964 (documents 255-308: U.S. reaction to events in the Gulf of Tonkin), Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, 1992.
Primary record
He summarized the events since the attack on the Maddox on August 2 and informed the nation that “air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile operations.”
I have asked Secretary McNamara to brief you and it would be unjustifiable to refer to it at all.
At 7:40 a.m. EDT (7:40 p.m., Saigon time), August 4, the destroyer Maddox , on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, reported that an attack from unidentified vessels appeared imminent.
Twenty-seven minutes later, the Maddox reported that it was being attacked by three North Vietnamese patrol craft and had opened fire.
The National Military Communications Center in the Department of Defense received the report at 9:30 a.m.
-
Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964), Milestone Documents, National Archives and Records Administration.
Primary record
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara did not report the captain's doubts to President Johnson.
-
Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964 (Robert J. Hanyok, Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001; approved for release 3 Nov 2005), National Security Agency, 2001.
Primary record
he required immediate verification of the North Vietnamese attack because of the doubts that started to be openly expressed within the administration.
If the two pieces of visual evidence - the searchlight and cockpit light reports - were contentious, the SIGINT was, in the minds of the sec- retary of defense, the JCS, and the president, the “smoking gun” evidence needed to justify the air strikes on North Vietnam.
“No boats,” he would later write, “no boat wakes, no ricochets off boats, no boat impacts, no torpedo wakes - nothing but black sea and American firepower.”
Within an hour of the end of the attack, Herrick relayed his doubts about the attack in an after-action report.
Captain Herrick actually was the commander of the destroyer division to which the Maddox belonged.
We have seen that the Gulf of Tonkin incidents occurred as a result of the congruence of the Desoto patrols and the maritime commando raids along the North Vietnamese coast carried out under OPLAN 34A.
The incidents, principally the second one of 4 August, led to the approval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by the U.S. Congress
For the first time ever, what will be presented in the following narrative is the complete SIGINT version of what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin between 2 and 4 August 1964.
-
Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Volume XX, 1968 (made public 2009), including the staff study of the Tonkin Gulf incidents, 24 January 1968, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010.
Primary record
The first one occurred on August 2, and there is no doubt but what this attack took place, both the United States and Hanoi agree
-
LBJ Tapes on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident (transcripts and notes by John Prados, from The White House Tapes, 2003), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 132, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 2003.
Scholarship & press
And following twenty-four hours after that, with this destroyer in that same area, undoubtedly led them to connect the two events.
-
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (the Pentagon Papers), Part IV.C.2.b, Evolution of the War: Military Pressures Against NVN, July-October 1964 (declassified 2011), U.S. Department of Defense, released by the National Archives, 1969.
Primary record
Certainly it offered a politically acceptable way of exerting direct punitive pressure on North Vietnam.
Page history 1 change
- Add 55 stories, each checked against its sources96e92fe6
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