Khalid al-Mihdhar

In June 2000, Mihdhar left California and returned to Yemen.

Bayoumi told them how pleasant San Diego was and offered to help them settle there.

We do not know whether the lunch encounter occurred by chance or design.

It is certainly possible that he has dissembled about some aspects of his story, perhaps to counter suspicion.

we have seen no credible evidence that he believed in violent extremism or knowingly aided extremist groups.

Fahad al Thumairy—an imam at the mosque and an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Arabian consulate from 1996 until 2003

The circumstantial evidence makes Thumairy a logical person to consider as a possible contact for Hazmi and Mihdhar.

after exploring the available leads, we have not found evidence that Thumairy provided assistance to the two operatives.

Bayoumi obliged by not only locating an apartment but also helping them fill out the lease application, co-signing the lease and, when the real estate agent refused to take cash for a deposit, helping them open a bank account (which they did with a $9,900 deposit)

Neither then nor later did Bayoumi give money to either Hazmi or Mihdhar, who had received money from KSM.

He was located leaving Yemen and tracked until he arrived in Kuala Lumpur on January 5, 2000.

Though Nawaf ’s trail was temporarily lost, the CIA soon identified “Khalid” as Khalid al Mihdhar.

The CIA did not try to register Mihdhar or Hazmi with the State Department’s

TIPOFF watchlist—either in January, when word arrived of Mihdhar’s visa, or in March, when word came that Hazmi, too, had had a U.S. visa and a ticket to Los Angeles.

None of this information—about Mihdhar’s U.S. visa or Hazmi’s travel to the United States—went to the FBI, and nothing more was done to track any of the three until January 2001, when the investigation of another bombing, that of the USS Cole, reignited interest in Khallad.

They decided that if Mihdhar was in the United States, he should be found.

We believe that if more resources had been applied and a significantly different approach taken, Mihdhar and Hazmi might have been found.

Still, the investigators would have needed luck as well as skill to find them prior to September 11 even if such searches had begun as early as August 23, when the lead was first drafted.

asked “Mary,” an FBI analyst detailed to the CIA’s Bin Ladin unit, to review all the Kuala Lumpur materials one more time.

On August 21, she located the March 2000 cable that “noted with interest” that Hazmi had flown to Los Angeles in January 2000.

“Mary” asked the Bin Ladin unit to draft a cable requesting that Mihdhar and Hazmi be put on the TIPOFF watchlist.

Both Hazmi and Mihdhar were added to this watchlist on August 24.

“Jane” took responsibility for the search effort inside the United States.

her draft lead was not sent until August 28. Her email told the New York agent that she wanted him to get started as soon as possible, but she labeled the lead as “Routine”

because the agent was designated a “criminal” FBI agent, not an intelligence FBI agent, the wall kept him from participating in any search for Mihdhar.

It is now clear that everyone involved was confused about the rules governing the sharing and use of information gathered in intelligence channels.

Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles.

More thorough investigation, however, has determined that Bayoumi did not pay rent or provide any funding to the hijackers.