A claim in circulation says U.S. antitrust enforcement is fully funded by monopolies and their donations. This story tests it line by line.
Nearly every number comes from the agencies’ own budget papers, the statutes, lobbying reports filed with the Senate, or court records. Where a newspaper is the source, the story says so. Where the sources here carry an answer from a company, a think tank or an agency, it is given in its own words; where one was not found, the scene says so. Nothing here says a payment bought a decision: no court or inquiry cited found that.
2026
The claim
A claim in circulation, which this story could not trace to a named speaker, says U.S. antitrust enforcement is “fully funded by monopolies and their donations.” This story checks it against the statutes, the agencies’ own budget papers and the lobbying records. Part of it is borne out: much of the money comes from fees that merging companies must pay by law. The rest needs care.
$572.6 millionPremerger filing fees the Antitrust Division expects in fiscal 2027, to be split evenly between it and the FTC (Division budget request, an estimate)
For FY 2027, the ATR expects HSR fee collections of $286.3 million. The filing fee revenue of approximately $572.6 million is divided evenly between the ATR and the Federal Trade Commission.
Antitrust Division (ATR): FY 2027 Budget Request At A Glance, U.S. Department of Justice. Primary record. Open the source
2 Jul 1890
1890
The Sherman Act became law on 2 July 1890 and made every trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade illegal. It gave the work of bringing cases to the district attorneys, under the Attorney General. The Supreme Court used it to break up Standard Oil in 1911; that story is told in The Trust. The Justice Department’s own table of antitrust appropriations begins in 1903 and lists $300,000 for 1914.
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
Sherman Antitrust Act, section 1 (current text). Primary record. Open the source
15 Oct 1914
1914
Two laws followed within three weeks. The FTC Act of 26 September created a commission to stop “unfair methods of competition” and ended the Bureau of Corporations, whose pending cases passed to the new commission. The Clayton Act of 15 October barred a company from buying another’s stock where the effect “may be to substantially lessen competition.”
persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, and common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, from using unfair methods of competition in commerce.
Federal Trade Commission Act, section 5, 26 September 1914. Primary record. Open the source
30 Sep 1976
1976
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 30 September 1976 added a new section 7A to the Clayton Act. Above set size thresholds, a company may not buy voting securities or assets until both sides have filed notice with the FTC and the Justice Department and a waiting period has run. The Act set no fee. The Antitrust Division’s own table shows its money coming wholly from the general fund: $22.2 million in 1976, $44.9 million in 1989.
no person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting securities or assets of any other person, unless both persons (or in the case of a tender offer, the acquiring person) file notification pursuant to rules under subsection (d) (1)
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, section 201, adding section 7A to the Clayton Act. Primary record. Open the source
21 Nov 1989
1989
A section of an appropriations act told the FTC to collect a $20,000 fee from “persons acquiring voting securities” who must file under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. The fees were to be “divided evenly” between the FTC and the Antitrust Division, with those above $40 million in 1990 sent to the Treasury. The Division’s table shows fees as 28 percent of its money in 1990, 54 percent in 1995 and 99.8 percent in 1999.
$20,000The first premerger filing fee, set by Congress on 21 November 1989
the Federal Trade Commission shall assess and collect filing fees established at $20,000 which shall be paid by persons acquiring voting securities or assets who are required to file premerger notifications
Public Law 101-162 (21 November 1989), 103 Stat. 988; section 605 on premerger filing fees is at 103 Stat. 1031, U.S. Government Publishing Office, 21 Nov 1989. Primary record. Open the source
29 Dec 2022
2022
A House report said the fees had last been updated in 2001. H.R. 3843 was introduced by three Democrats (Neguse, Cicilline, Nadler) and three Republicans (Spartz, Buck, Roy). It cut the lowest fee from $45,000 to $30,000, set $2.25 million for deals of $5 billion or more, and tied every fee to inflation. The committee’s minority views objected that “the bill places no limits on how the antitrust enforcers must use new funds.” The House passed it on 29 September 2022; it became law on 29 December as Division GG of the omnibus spending act.
242 to 184House vote passing the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act, 29 September 2022
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 242, nays 184, not voting 6
Congressional Record, 29 September 2022, pp. H8268-H8269: passage of H.R. 3843, U.S. Government Publishing Office, 29 Sep 2022. Primary record. Open the source
Jun 2021 – Dec 2022
Who lobbied
A search of the Senate’s lobbying database finds more than 40 organizations naming the bill in reports for 2021 and 2022. They include Apple, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Amazon, the Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, unions and advocacy groups. Most list it with the other House antitrust bills and say nothing for or against; the Business Roundtable says it was “monitoring.” The Farmers Union lists “support for increased merger filing fees,” and the Demand Progress report opens “In support of stronger antitrust laws and enforcement.” The five tech firms’ reports state no side.
Google, federal lobbying report, fourth quarter of 2022. Primary record. Open the source
2024
The FTC
Its Program and Financing schedules give what actually came in. Premerger fees were 31 percent of its budget authority in fiscal 2020, 41 percent in 2023 (with another $172 million of earlier years’ fees), 58 percent in 2024 and 66 percent in 2025; the general fund paid 65, 17, 39 and 32 percent. The 2027 request, a plan and not a result, would take 67 percent from premerger fees and 29 percent from the general fund. About half of what the FTC spends goes to consumer protection.
58%Share of the FTC’s fiscal 2024 budget authority paid by premerger fees: $245 million of $426 million, actual receipts
Federal Trade Commission, Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Budget Justification, U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Primary record. Open the sourceArchived copy
2024
The Division
Its table shows how much fee money each year’s appropriation bill counted on, not always what came in: collections ran $11.9 million over its appropriation in 2024 and $49.2 million over in 2025. Counted fees were 62 to 85 percent of its money from 2010 to 2023. Since fiscal 2024 the table shows no general-fund money, and the 2027 request puts that line at an estimated $0. That has happened before, in 2000 to 2003 and in 2009. If fees fell short, the general fund would pay.
estimated $0General-fund money in the Antitrust Division’s fiscal 2027 request, because the appropriation is cut as fees arrive
the sum herein appropriated from the general fund shall be reduced as such offsetting collections are received during fiscal year 2027, so as to result in a final fiscal year 2027 appropriation from the general fund estimated at $0.
Antitrust Division: FY 2027 Performance Budget, Congressional Submission, U.S. Department of Justice. Primary record. Open the source
2023
A fee, not a donation
The fee is owed before review: “no notification shall be considered filed” until it is paid, and it buys no clearance. Of fiscal 2023’s deals, 417 were over $1 billion, and the tiers at about $920 million and up brought in about $188 million of $346 million, 54 percent; the new schedule began in late February, so its top tiers cover only part of the year. “Fully funded by fees” fits the Division’s recent budgets. For the FTC the general fund paid 17 to 39 percent in 2023 to 2025, but its fee income ($245 million in 2024) now exceeds its competition spending ($228 million), and the papers do not say which fee dollars go to which mission.
417 of 1,735Reviewable deals in fiscal 2023 that were valued over $1 billion, nearly a quarter (HSR annual report)
Nearly one-fourth of the transactions reviewed by the agencies were valued over $1 billion
Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2023 (FTC and Antitrust Division), U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Primary record. Open the sourceArchived copy
2023
When deals fall
Fees follow filings. Net fees for fiscal 2023 were $343.6 million, part of the year on the new schedule; on the old fees they would have been $235.9 million. The FTC’s schedules show a real shortfall: in fiscal 2020, with 1,637 deals, premerger fees were $102 million and the general fund paid $217 million. The Division’s table shows the same in 2004, when the fee estimate fell $21.1 million short of its funding and direct money made up the gap.
3,152 to 1,805Deals reported under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in fiscal 2022 and 2023; fiscal 2021 had 3,520, the highest in the report’s ten-year table
Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2023 (FTC and Antitrust Division), U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Primary record. Open the sourceArchived copy
2025
Lobbying and campaign money
OpenSecrets puts Alphabet’s federal lobbying, on all issues rather than antitrust alone, at $14.45 million in 2023 and $14.79 million in 2024. For January to September 2025 it lists Meta at $19.79 million, Amazon at $13.99 million and Alphabet at $12.26 million; the Chamber of Commerce leads at $53.69 million. Companies cannot give to candidates directly; for the 2024 cycle OpenSecrets counts $20.6 million from Alphabet’s PAC, employees and their families, 90 percent of it from individuals. No court or inquiry cited here found that any of this money decided a case.
$16.54 millionAlphabet’s federal lobbying in 2025 on all issues, with its units, by OpenSecrets from Senate records
$16,540,000 Total Lobbying Expenditures, 2025
Client Profile: Alphabet Inc, lobbying (OpenSecrets), OpenSecrets. Scholarship & press. Open the sourceArchived copy
30 Aug 2017
Washington, 2017
On 27 June the Open Markets team at New America praised the EU’s record €2.42 billion fine on Google and urged U.S. enforcers to build on it. On 30 August New America ended director Barry Lynn’s employment. Anne-Marie Slaughter, New America’s CEO, says the cause was his repeated refusal to adhere to its standards, and calls the Times’s implication that Google lobbied for it “absolutely false”; Google says it played no role. Zephyr Teachout, who chairs the group Lynn’s team formed, says Slaughter told him to go within 72 hours of the release, and reports the Times’s figure of over $21 million from Google and Eric Schmidt’s family foundation to New America. Slaughter says the two had worked for two months on a spin-out. This story has not read the Times article.
We don’t agree with every group 100% of the time, and while we sometimes respectfully disagree, we respect each group’s independence, personnel decisions, and policy perspectives,
The Global Antitrust Institute sits in George Mason University’s law school. In 2020 The New York Times reported that tech companies, Google and Amazon among them, pay for most of it, and that it does not disclose its funders. The programs it described were for foreign officials: one week-long conference was for 30 foreign competition officials, and the institute’s head said it had trained more than 850 foreign judges and regulators. The Times reported $200,000 from Google in 2017 and $300,000 in 2018; two invoices in a House record show $100,000 in December 2017 and $200,000 in August 2018, which may be only part of the payments. The Times added: “It’s difficult to determine the impact of the institute.”
The Global Antitrust Institute is bankrolled in large part by tech companies — corporate donors like Google, Amazon and Qualcomm — that are facing antitrust scrutiny from some of the regulators who attended its programs
The New York Times, 27 July 2020. Scholarship & press. Open the source
27 Jul 2020
Their answers
Google said it requires grantees to disclose their funding; the Times noted that Google’s list names the university’s foundation, where the institute’s donations are directed, but not the institute. Amazon said its support “does not mean we always agree with their viewpoints or that we direct the work that they do.” Tommaso Valletti, a former chief competition economist at the European Commission, told the Times the institute does not give “a balanced perspective of economics and its application to antitrust.” Joshua Wright, its head, said its mission, curriculum and lectures were available online for the public to assess, and that agency officials from around the world choose to send staff.
That combination of academic and practical experience is one reason enforcement agencies’ officials from around the world consistently choose to send their staff to our programs
Joshua Wright, executive director of the Global Antitrust Institute, quoted by The New York Times. Scholarship & press. Open the source
3 Jan 2013
3 January 2013
The FTC announced a settlement of its competition investigations of Google, by votes of 4 to 1 and 5 to 0. On search bias it closed the case unanimously after staff reviewed “over nine million pages of documents,” finding that, in the main, Google’s changes were made to improve search. Three commissioners found strong concerns that Google copied rivals’ content, and two that it limited advertisers’ use of rival engines; Google committed to stop both. By 4 to 1 the FTC ordered Google to stop seeking to exclude rivals with essential patents. Commissioner Rosch concurred in closing but did not join the statement.
This action is not to be construed as a determination that a violation may not have occurred, just as the pendency of an investigation should not be construed as a determination that a violation has occurred.
The Wall Street Journal reported on a 2012 FTC staff report on Google, part of which the FTC had released by mistake. Reuters wrote that it indicated key staff members favored suing Google. Three commissioners answered that staff attorneys had raised concerns about “several other Google practices,” on which the Commission obtained commitments, while on search all five Commissioners found no legal basis for action. ICLE, a think tank, wrote that staff did not recommend suit on search bias. Google’s reply and the staff report’s own text are not in the sources opened here.
all five Commissioners (three Democrats and two Republicans) agreed that there was no legal basis for action with respect to the main focus of the investigation – search.
Chairwoman Ramirez and Commissioners Brill and Ohlhausen, FTC statement, 25 March 2015. Primary record. Open the sourceArchived copy
2015
Two careers
Joshua Wright was an FTC commissioner from 2013 to 2015; the FTC says he was not at the Commission when it decided the search case. At his 2012 nomination, the Times says, he was criticized for paid work for Google and agreed to recuse himself from Google matters. After the FTC he joined Wilson Sonsini, which the Times says represented Google, and led the institute. Susan Creighton led the FTC’s Bureau of Competition from July 2003 and is a Wilson Sonsini partner; her firm biography gives no date for leaving the FTC, and the 2013 closing letter was addressed to her as counsel. Nothing cited here says either acted improperly.
During the F.T.C. nomination process in 2012, Wright was criticized for his paid work for the search giant and agreed to recuse himself from Google matters.
The New York Times, 27 July 2020. Scholarship & press. Open the source
7 May 2026
A different case
On 20 October 2020 the Justice Department and 11 states sued Google over search. The federal case was about default-search agreements with browser makers, phone makers and carriers. A closer cousin of the 2013 question came from state plaintiffs, who said Google limited rivals’ visibility on its results page; in 2023 the court ruled for Google on that. In 2024 it held that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and entered final judgment on 5 December 2025. Google appealed on 16 January 2026 and the plaintiffs cross-appealed on 3 February; the sources here run to a court order of 7 May 2026.
Last year, this court ruled that Defendant Google LLC had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act: “Google is a monopolist, and it has acted as one to maintain its monopoly.”
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, remedies opinion, 2 September 2025. Primary record. Open the source
1 Feb 2021
Public comment
Firms also write to the FTC in the open. BlackRock wrote on 15 January 2019 about the FTC’s hearing on common ownership. Vanguard wrote on 1 February 2021 about the FTC’s December 2020 proposal to update the Hart-Scott-Rodino rules, saying it “cannot support the proposal” because of cost to investors, and called common ownership “an unproven hypothesis.” Both hold shares for clients in Microsoft and other large firms, as Who Owns BlackRock and Vanguard shows. Nothing cited here shows any letter changed a decision.
resulting in potentially hundreds of millions of dollars of filing fees that would be borne by our investors
Vanguard, letter to the Federal Trade Commission, 1 February 2021. Primary record. Open the source